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ABSTRACT 
There have been many NIME papers over the years on 
augmented or actuated instruments [2][10][19][22].  Many of 
these papers have focused on the technical description of how 
these instruments have been produced, or as in the case of 
Machover’s ‘Hyperinstruments’ [19], on producing instruments 
over which performers have ‘absolute control’ and emphasise 
‘learnability. perfectibility and repeatability’ [19]. In contrast to 
this approach, this paper outlines a philosophical position 
concerning the relationship between instruments and 
performers in improvisational contexts that recognises the 
agency of the instrument within the performance process. It 
builds on a post-phenomenological understanding of the  
human/instrument relationship in which the human and the 
instrument are understood as co-defining entities without fixed 
boundaries; an approach that actively challenges notions of 
instrumental mastery and ‘absolute control’. This paper then 
takes a practice-based approach to outline how such 
philosophical concerns have fed into the design of an 
augmented actuated cello system, The Feral Cello, that has 
been designed to explicitly explore these concerns through 
practice.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As a practice-based researcher my improvisational practice 
involves the use of technologies for the creation of performance 
environments within which I partake in technologically 
mediated-performance. I am particularly interested in the 
relationship with technology in this setting and the ways in 
which we can understand and problematise the performer–
technology relationship. I position myself as part of the 
growing body of instrument-builder/ improvisers (such as 
[3][9][12][26]) that are exploring techno-centric approaches to 
musical improvisation that implicitly examine these human-
technology relationships through their creative practice. My 
practice is informed by my understanding of a prominent 
discourse within the field of the Philosophy of Technology that 
addresses the conceptualisation of humans’ relationship with 
technology. In particular, there has been a growing acceptance 
of a rejection of technological determinism. This rejection has 
led theorists to explore human-technology interactions from a 
variety of social, political and philosophical perspectives. 
Attempts to characterise interactions and relationships between 
technologies and humans have been made by academics such as 
Ihde [16] Feenberg [8], Haraway [14], Hayles [15], and 
Verbeek [27] to different extents. There has also been 
discussion of various levels of integration between 
technologies, the body and the mind as exemplified by recent 
developments in philosophies of mind and the cognitive 
sciences. Some of these propose not only an embodied, situated 
theory of mind but also an extended theory of mind in which 
technologies can be conceived as part of an extended cognitive 
system [3][4]. Finally, there has been growing discussion 
regarding the agency of technology in the processes of 
creation/interaction, and in the co-evolution of human-machine 
interactions. Post-phenomenological and post-human 
understandings of our relationships with technology in 
particular, have been put forward as an interesting avenue to 
conceptualise and explore the inter-agency or intra-agency of 
humans and technology within a performance context [3]. This 
paper outlines these philosophical concepts in as much as they 
have fed into the design of a recent creative output The Feral 
Cello produced in collaboration with cellist Laura Reid [24]. 
Following Green [13] I feel that a practice-led approach where 
the first concerns are of a musical nature can highlight how the 
technological and philosophical concerns have affected the 
instrumental design and musical activity.  
 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
Implicit and in some cases explicit, in the body of techno-
centric improvisational context outlined in the introduction is a 
rejection of the notion of technological determinism [8]. 
Technological determinism, still arguably the tacitly accepted 
view of technology by society, suggests that ‘technology 
operates in a decontextualized autonomous domain’ [7], such 
that technology is held to follow a fixed path of progression, 
which is pre-determined and unavoidable, and over which 
humans have no influence [8]. Di Scipio [7] states that a 
deterministic conception of technology suggests that 
technology operates at ‘an autonomous extra social level’ that 
implies for the artist that the technical environment within 
which they work ‘is not her/his affair at all’ [7].  
Feenberg [8] describes an alternative to technological 
determinism that he terms ‘Critical Theory’. This situates 
technology, not as a neutral tool, but rather as something that 
shapes and is shaped by societal functions and use. In this 
conception the progression of technology is also open to being 
influenced and changed by users who in turn are also shaped 
through its use. Taking such a non-detereministic stance 
suggests that for a musician, dealing with the technology as part 
of their performance practice is ‘an opportunity to challenge 
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established and uncritically accepted practices and theories, the 
known modalities of personal or shared modalities of music 
making’ [7].  
3. INSTRUMENTAL AGENCY 
3.1 Agency in Practice 
As part of an active decision to explore such issues as part of 
my performance practice I have become increasingly interested 
in ways of foregrounding & problematising the notion of 
technological agency as part of the creative process. As I see 
my work as part of the critical context of instrument 
builders/improvisers I would first like to explore some other 
projects that have explicitly informed my creative approach.   
 
James Ferguson in Imagined agency: Technology, 
Unpredictability and Ambiguity [9] discusses his practice as a 
performer of technologically mediated music. In this article 
Ferguson is in particular writing about a hybrid electric guitar 
setup called Machine-Assembled Dislocation (MAD). Ferguson 
categories the human/machine interaction as performing with 
‘feral technologies’ [9, p.143], in which the music is ‘an 
emergent form, radiating from pre-composed situations and 
instrumental ecologies, the performance of and in which it is 
improvised’ [9, p.145]. For Ferguson, the instrumental agencies 
are imagined, yet they are no less important as they provide 
‘fruitful creative stimulus’ [9, pg 143] to the performers and 
help articulate his practice in which he ‘seeks out resistance and 
agency in a variety of forms, and attempts to interact with it’ [9, 
p.143]. 
 
David Borgo’s work and writing has been a large inspiration to 
this project. Borgo proposes that he devises hybrid instruments 
that both ‘extend and complicate our sense of control’ [3, p.2]. 
He has strived to avoid divisions between artists and 
technologists specifically looking to avoid the ‘division … 
between acoustic and electronic performers’.  Borgo presents 
perhaps the most radical conception of agency in practice 
drawing on Actor Network Theory [17] to provide ‘insight 
concerning “distributed agency” or “interagency” between 
humans and technology’ as a way on conceptualising his 
interactions with technology in his musical improvisations.   
 
Such discussions provide a conception of instrumental agency 
on a continuum from the purely imagined agency of Ferguson, 
where the agency is ascribed by the performer, to a more post-
phenomenological understanding of agency in which the 
agency of the humans and technology are mutually co-
productive of each other.  
3.2 Agency in Theory 
This continuum of degrees of agency is also represented in the 
literature. An imagined agency can be likened to Dennett’s 
Intentional Stance. In Intentional System Theory Dennett sets 
out an intentional stance one can take to technology in adopting 
a stance where we can interpret, explain or predict the behavior 
of something by attributing minds to them [6, p.1]. ‘The 
intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the behavior of 
an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if 
it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by 
a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ [6, p.1]. For 
Dennett the intentional stance is the natural way of trying to 
understand something if it too complicated to break it down 
into an understanding of its internal logics, leading to humans 
to anthropomorphise common encounters with technologies 
such as their cars. This I see as very similar to Ferguson’s 
conceptualisation of his performance system. 
 
Idhe [16] takes a different approach in examining technologies 
in use. In particular, in how they might mediate our interaction 
with the world. Building on a phenomenological understanding 
of intentionality, the property of mental phenomenon as being 
directed onto an object Idhe presents four different ways in 
which technology can mediate this intentionality. The four 
categories are: Embodied; the technology becomes part of the 
body schema: Hermeneutic; they become representations of 
reality with which we react: Alterity; ‘technology-as-other’ [16, 
p.98] the technology becomes something with which we 
interact: Background; technologies create a context for our 
perceptions. Idhe describes a relationship with a musical 
instrument as an embodied relation, one in which ‘The player 
picks up the instrument (having learned to embody it) and 
expressively produces the desired music’ [16, p.95]. However, 
for computer based music, particularly where the computer is 
involved in ‘random’ decision making, he likens the 
interactions to those described by the alterity relation.  In this 
relation, the technology ceases to be a transparent tool but 
rather becomes something that is present to our consciousness.  
Technology in this instance possess agency through the fact 
that it modifies or mediates human intentionality. 
 
Pickering [23] takes this post-phenomenological understanding 
further. For Pickering, human and material agency are both 
‘temporally emergent’, such that they simply emerge ‘in the 
real time of practice’ [23, p.566].  He states that his analysis of 
scientific practice ‘is posthumanist not simply in its twinning of 
human with material agency but, more profoundly, in its 
insistence that material and human agencies are mutually and 
emergently productive of one another’ [23, p.566]. Pickering is 
thus not just recognizing that material entities and humans can 
posses agency or that technologies can exhibit agency through 
their use but rather that human and technology agency are 
mutually co-defining and co-constructive.  
 
Barad does not attribute agency to human intentionality or 
subjectivity, she does not believe that agency is an intrinsic 
attribute of an object. Rather she defines it as ‘ the enactment of 
iterative changes to particular practices through the dynamics 
of intra-activity’ [1, p.826]. Agency is thus defined in the mode 
of activity, it is enacted.  Barad recognises “’human’, ‘non 
human’ and ‘cyborgian’ forms of agency” [1, p.826]  Seeing 
the human not as a fixed form, but one whose boundaries are 
fluid and changeable because ‘agency is a matter of changes in 
the apparatuses of bodily production’ [1, p.826]. 
 
We have reached a place where agency is not an attribute that is 
possessed by an object, be that human or machine. Rather 
agency is something that arises in activity in the moment. It 
cannot be attached to fixed forms as these forms are fluid in 
their construction dependent on context of use and activity.  
4. THE FERAL CELLO  
What follows is a description of a system generated in response 
to this philosophical context. In an attempt to embody the idea 
that the musical instrument has agency as part of the creative 
process, the system has been designed such that the acoustics of 
the instrument can be altered in real time by the instrument 
itself.  
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Figure 1 Augmented Cello in use. 
4.1  Technical Description 
With a physical construction inspired by the growing body of 
actuated instruments [22] and IRCAM’s Smart Instruments [25] 
this system features an actuated cello whose feedback through 
the body of the instrument is controlled by machine listening to 
its own output.  
 
An acoustic pickup under the bridge sends the cello sound to a 
laptop running Max [5] for processing. The Zsa.Descriptors 
[20] package is used to analyse the incoming sound in terms of 
Spectral Centroid, Spectral Flux, Spectral Brightness and 
Spectral Rolloff. This time dependent information is then fed 
into an implementation of IRCAM’s Gesture Follower [11] 
software. Before the performance a number of predetermined 
performance gestures are recorded.  These gestures are such 
things as pizzicato on a D string, sul ponticello on an A string 
or open strings. As you would expect, gestures with distinctly 
different spectral or timing qualities work best for recognition 
purposes. In the performance, the algorithm attempts to match 
the cello sound to the recorded gestures. Once it has found a 
match it switches the order and type of digital signal processing 
applied to the sound through choosing from a set of presets 
predefined by the composer and inspired by Leafcutter John’s 
Mr Matrix [18], which is a real graphical Matrix controller for 
Max that allows real time swapping of DSP in performance. 
The DSP available is: short delay; long delay; spectral freezing; 
granular synthesis; distortion; enveloping; waveshaping or 
spectrally managed feedback. This processed audio is then 
played back through the body of the cello through actuators 
placed upon its body. This processed audio can also be 
separated from the cello and played back through additional 
loudspeakers to address issues of balance between the acoustic 
and electronic material. The cello the Max patch and the 
processed sound through the instrument can be conceived as 
one augmented hybrid acoustic/electronic instrument.  
 
4.2 Compositional Concerns 
The system has been developed with cellist and composer 
Laura Reid who has written the piece Gemmeleg to be 
performed at Noisefloor 2017 [21] and NIME 2017. Gemmeleg 
features a semi-structured improvisation in which the performer 
 
 
Figure 2 Screen shot of Max patch showing analysis utilizing 
Zsa.Descriptors and IRCAMs Gesture Follower. 
 
 
Figure 3 System outline 
 
intends to explore five compositional ideas. Each of these five 
compositional ideas are linked to gestures stored in the system 
such that when the performer starts a new section of the 
improvisation it should trigger a change in the signal processing 
of the system. Responses from the system are consistent within 
each performance, i.e. the algorithm should choose the same 
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DSP setup depending on the recognised gesture; however, 
errors in the algorithmic matching process which are 
exacerbated by the fact that the signal processed cello sound is 
also feeding back through the body of the cello are actively 
exploited to highlight the agency of the cello as part of the 
improvisational process. As such, the system can switch sounds 
in an unpredictable way, which in turn prompts the improviser 
to respond. This switching not only highlights the agency of the 
cello within the performance but also acts as a springboard for 
improvisational creativity within the piece. As the DSP changes 
the cello’s response to the performer the performer has to 
actively readjust their relationship to the cello both in terms of 
the instrument and in terms of their intention for the 
improvisation. I argue that this system is best understood not as 
a cello with separate audio processing or even as a cello with a 
separate performer but as a single performer/cello/machine 
system with mutable boundaries, both in terms of agency and 
subjectification.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a philosophical context for the 
creation of a performer–actuated cello system that seeks to 
explore conceptions of machinic agency through creative 
practice. It outlines a system that has been explicitly designed 
to highlight the mutable boundaries between performer, 
musical instrument and music within the act of performance, 
challenging the notion that instruments are objects to be 
mastered.  
 
6. REFERENCES 
[1] Barad, K. Posthumanist Performativity: Toward and 
Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter. Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28:3, 801-831, 
2003. 
[2] Bevilacqua, F, Rasamimanana,N, Flety, E. Lemouton, S. 
& Baschet,F. The augmented violin project: research, 
composition and performance report. Proceedings of the 
2006 International Conference on New Interfaces for 
Musical Expression. 2006. 
[3] Borgo, D. 2014. The Ghost in the Music, or the 
Perspective of an Improvising Ant. Oxford Handbooks 
online. 2014 
[4] Clark, A. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, 
and the Future of Human Intelligence. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
[5] Cycling’74 Max. http://cycling74.com  accessed 31/01/17 
[6] Dennett, D.C.. Intentional Systems Theory, in Oxford 
Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Mclaughlin, A. 
Beckerman, S. Walter (eds.), New York : Oxford 
University Press Starts pg 339. 2009 
[7] Di Scipio, A.  Towards a critical theory of (music) 
technology: Computer music and subversive 
rationalization, Proceeding of International Computer 
Music Conference 1997.   
[8] Feenberg, A. Critical Theory of Technology, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
[9] Ferguson, J.R. Imagined Agency: Technology, 
Unpredictability, and Ambiguity, Contemporary Music 
Review, 32:2-3, 135-149, 2013. 
[10] Freed,A. Wessel,D, Zbyszynski, M. & Uitti, F,M. 
Augmenting the Cello. Proceedings of the 2006 
International Conference on New Interfaces for Musical 
Expression 2006.  
[11] Gesture Follower, 
http://imtr.ircam.fr/imtr/Gesture_Follower accessed 
31/01/17 
[12] Green, O., User Serviceable Parts: Practice, Technology, 
Sociality and Method in Live Electronic Musicking. Ph.D 
Thesis, City University London 2013 
[13] Green ,O. NIME Musicality and Practice-Led Methods. 
Proceedings of the International Conference on New 
Interfaces for Musical Expression, 2014. 
[14] Haraway, D. A cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and 
socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In D. 
Haraway (Ed.), Simians, cyborgs and women: the 
reinvention of nature (pp. 149–181). New York: 
Routledge. 1991. 
[15] Hayles, N. K.  How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
[16] Ihde, D. Technology and the lifeworld. 
Bloomington/Minneapolis: Indiana University Press. 1990 
[17] Latour, B.  Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to 
Actor-Network Theory. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. Kindle edition. 
[18] Leafcutter, J.  Mr Matrix http://leafcutterjohn.com/?p=1778 
accessed 16/4/2017 
[19] Machover, T. and Chung, J. Hyperinstruments: Musically 
intelligent and interactive performance and creativity 
systems. In Proceedings of the International  Computer 
Music Conference, 1989.  
[20] Mikhail M & Emmauel, J. Zsa.Descriptors http://www.e--
j.com accessed 31/01/17 
[21] Noisefloor  http://www.noisefloor.org.uk accessed 16/4/2017 
[22] Overholt, D. The Overtone Fiddle: An Actuated Acoustic 
Instrument. Proceedings of the International Conference 
on New Interfaces for Expression, 2011.  
[23] Pickering, A. The Mangle of Practice: Agency and 
Emergence in the Sociology of Science . American Journal 
of Sociology  99:3, 559-589, 1993. 
[24] Reid,L. www.laurareid.co.uk accessed 16/4/17 
[25] SMART instruments made in IRCAM 
http://medias.ircam.fr/x2d1bf5 accessed 30/1/2017 
[26] Stapleton, P. Dialogic Instruments: Virtuosity (Re)Located 
in Improvised Performance "My Favorite Supplement: 
The Joy of the Gizmo": LEA Special Issue, Supplement to 
LMJ17 2008. 
[27] Verbeek, P. Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the 
phenomenology of human–technology relations. Phenom 
Cogn Sci 7:387-395. 2008 
 
 
282
